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ARGUMENT 
I. THERE W A S N O ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT M R , AND M R S . SEMNANI H A D BEEN 
PERSONALLY SERVED 
Rule 4(e)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that personal service shall 
be made: 
Upon any individual . . . by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the 
complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's 
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the 
complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service 
of process. 
Appellee's Brief asserts that Mr. and Mrs. Semnani were properly served because (1) 
they were known to live at the address where service was left, (2) the person accepting 
service at that address did not identify himself, and (3) shortly after service of process Mrs. 
Semnani contacted Southland about the suit. As discussed in Appellant's Brief, none of 
these facts establish that Mr. or Mrs. Semnani were properly served. 
First, the only admissible evidence in the record establishes that Mr. and Mrs. 
Semnani did not live at the address where service was made. Compare Appellant's Brief, 
Ex. A with Appellant's Brief, Ex. B f^l[ 4, 5, 6. The only "evidence" asserted by Southland 
that Mr. and Mrs. Semnani actually lived at the residence at the time of service is a statement 
that a friend of Mrs. Semnani told Defendant's principal, Ms. Garza, that Mr. and Mrs. 
Semnani lived at the Mulholland Property. See Appellant's Brief, Ex. D f 6. As discussed 
in Appellant's Brief, this is clearly inadmissible hearsay evidence. 
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Second, the fact that the Affidavits of Service indicate that a person failed to identify 
himself does not establish that in fact Mr. or Mrs. Semnani was served. A person could for 
any number of reasons refuse to identify him or herself. The critical fact is that the 
Affidavits do not attest that process was served on any defendant. There is no evidence that 
Mr. or Mrs. Semnani was the "John Doe" served by the constable. See Appellant's Brief, Ex. 
B f 7. 
Third, the fact that Mrs. Semnani called Ms. Garza and asked "what [she] was doing" 
does not in any way suggest that Mrs. Semnani had been properly served. At the most, it 
suggests that Mrs. Semnani knew about the lawsuit. However, as discussed in Appellant's 
Brief, actual knowledge of a law suit does not give a court jurisdiction over a defendant. 
II. M R . AND M R S . SEMNANI W E R E N O T REQUIRED TO PRESENT A MERITORIOUS 
DEFENSE IN ORDER T O VACATE T H E JUDGMENT 
A. Southland Failed to Raise the Meritorious Defense Claim Below 
For the first time in the course of this case, Southland argues that because Mr. and 
Mrs. Semnani have not demonstrated that they have a meritorious defense, the motion to 
vacate was properly denied. Southland is entitled to "utilize the judicially created doctrine 
of affirming . . . on other proper grounds, even if [the grounds are] raised for the first time 
on appeal." State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). However, in order 
to properly and fairly use this doctrine, this Court requires thorough briefing of the issue. Id. 
at 150. As explained in Montoya: 
[T]he appellee still has the burden of thoroughly briefing an issue, however 
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recently it was raised. Under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, which is applicable to an appellee through Rule 24(b), an appellee 
must provide an argument "containing the contentions and reasons of the 
[appellee] with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." When an appellee fails 
to comply with this rule, we will decline to address the issue.. . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In support of its argument that Mr. and Mrs. Semnani failed to demonstrate any 
meritorious defense, Southland cites one case and devotes two lines to the argument. Not 
only is this not thorough briefing, but Southland failed to explain the grounds for reviewing 
the issue that clearly was not preserved in the trial court. Accordingly, this Court should 
decline to address the argument. 
R The Meritorious Defense Rule Does Not Apply to Jurisdictional Questions 
Even if this Court decides to address the issue, Mr. and Mrs. Semnani still are entitled 
to prevail. Despite Southland's contention to the contrary, Mr. and Mrs. Semnani are not 
required to demonstrate a meritorious defense. There is no question that "when a motion to 
vacate a judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no 
jurisdiction: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process 
to the one against whom it runs''' State Dep 't ofSoc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 
(Utah 1989) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); accord Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 
290 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 771 n.2 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997). Consequently, when a party demonstrates that a court lacks jurisdiction, the 
95652 SE526 049 3 
court can inquire no further; it must dismiss the suit. See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 43 Utah 53, 
134 P. 595, 597 (Utah 1913) ("If a plaintiff can enforce such a rule, then he . . . would be 
permitted to take advantage of his own wrong, since he could compel the defendant in such 
an action to submit his or her person to the jurisdiction of the court, when neither personal 
nor subject-matter jurisdiction . . . could be obtained in any other way."). The only case 
Southland cites in support of its position indicates that the meritorious defense rule should 
not apply when the motion "is predicated solely on the ground that the court was entirely 
without jurisdiction." Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 510 n.5 
(Utah 1976). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's error in denying the motion to vacate the default judgment is clear. 
It could not and did not have jurisdiction. In holding as it did, the trial court failed to 
consider the requirements of Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and, instead, 
relied upon its finding that Mr. and Mrs. Semnani actually knew about the lawsuit.1 A trial 
court does not obtain jurisdiction by a litigant's actual knowledge of a lawsuit. Accordingly, 
Mr. and Mrs. Semnani respectfully request that the trial court's order denying their motion 
1
 In Appellee's Brief, Southland concludes that "the [District Court found that the 
Defendants knew about the lawsuit, were actually served, and that good cause did not exist to set 
aside the default judgment." Appellee's Brief 4. This statement is incorrect. The District Court's 
order states that the District Court found "that the defendants knew about this lawsuit in the spring 
of 1996. Accordingly, this Court concludes that there is no reason to set aside the default judgment." 
Appellant's Brief, Ex. E. The District Court never found, as asserted by Southland, that Mr. and 
Mrs. Semnani were actually served or that good cause did not exist to set aside the default judgment. 
95652 SE526 049 4 
to vacate the default judgment and quash writ of execution be reversed. 
DATED this 2T*<iay of July, 1999. 
NIELS ENIOR, F.C 
Weston 
D. Scott Crook 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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